Hello all! This is the third post in a series on a player-evaluation project I have worked on for more than a decade.

The first was my ranking of the best players of the 2025–26 season. The second ranked my top single-season peaks since 2000. This post extends the same framework across the full shot-clock era.

The central question remains:

How much does this version of a player increase a typical good team’s probability of winning the championship?

Since early 2016, I've spent hundreds of hours poring over film and data to go season by season through NBA history using that framework. For this post, I took the highest-graded version of each player and compared those peaks directly.

My background informs the structure of the project. I have played, coached, and scouted basketball at multiple levels, worked in NBA front-office environments, and have a professional background in inferential statistics.

The methodology is the same as in the previous posts. It combines statistical evidence, film study, historical comparison, playoff translation, scalability, and explicit uncertainty estimates. A fuller explanation is available in the original post, while the second post shows how I applied the framework to 21st-century peaks.

This ranking assumes full health.

Scoring and uncertainty

Each ranked player is listed as:

Season — Player (plausible ranking range) (OFF, DEF, NET)

OFF and DEF are estimates of offensive and defensive championship-value impact, roughly measured in points per game of value contribution, with NET representing the total. The scale is calibrated around how much value a player adds to a random good team in championship terms.

My rough historical grading scale is:

• 7.0+ — GOAT-level peak
• 6.0+ — All-time peak
• 5.4–6.0 — Strong MVP
• 4.6–5.4 — Solid MVP
• 4.0–4.6 — Weak MVP
• 3.0+ — Strong All-NBA
• 1.5+ — All-Star level
• 0.0 — Neutral Impact

These categories are continuous rather than sharply separated. A 5.3 player and a 5.5 player are not all that far apart just because they happen to fall on the opposite side of a label.

The ranking ranges matter for the same reason.

If I list a player at (3–19), that means his listed rank is my central estimate, but reasonable changes in assumptions could move him anywhere from approximately third to nineteenth while holding the rest of the evaluations fixed.

This becomes particularly important in an all-time exercise. (I know, these ranges are huge!) In a normal NBA season, there may only be a few players in the MVP range. Here, I am taking the best version of every historically great player and placing all of them in one distribution. The result is an extremely compressed upper tail.

That is why some ranges become very wide: many players have relatively small differences in underlying value, and when working across the entire shot-clock era this fundamentally becomes a hair-splitting exercise.

Greatest Peaks of the Shot-Clock Era

1. ’91 Michael Jordan (1–4) (6.2, 1.1, 7.3)
2. ’13 LeBron James (1–5) (5.6, 1.6, 7.2)
3. ’00 Shaquille O’Neal (1–13) (5.2, 1.4, 6.6)
4. ’93 Hakeem Olajuwon (1–15) (2.8, 3.7, 6.5)
5. ’74 Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (3–16) (4.4, 2.1, 6.5)
6. ’64 Wilt Chamberlain (3–19) (3.2, 3.2, 6.4)
7. ’62 Bill Russell (3–19) (0.5, 5.8, 6.3)
8. ’86 Larry Bird (3–19) (5.5, 0.8, 6.3)
9. ’16 Stephen Curry (3–19) (6.2, 0.1, 6.3)
10. ’25 Nikola Jokić (3–19) (6.2, 0.1, 6.3)
11. ’04 Kevin Garnett (3–23) (2.8, 3.4, 6.2)
12. ’03 Tim Duncan (3–23) (3.0, 3.1, 6.1)
13. ’87 Magic Johnson (4–23) (6.0, 0.1, 6.1)
14. ’65 Jerry West (3–25) (5.4, 0.5, 5.9)
15. ’26 Victor Wembanyama (5–27) (2.3, 3.6, 5.9)
16. ’77 Bill Walton (6–27) (2.2, 3.7, 5.9)
17. ’09 Dwyane Wade (9–27) (5.1, 0.7, 5.8)
18. ’65 Oscar Robertson (11–28) (5.5, 0.2, 5.7)
19. ’22 Giannis Antetokounmpo (12–28) (3.2, 2.5, 5.7)
20. ’95 David Robinson (12–28) (2.5, 3.1, 5.6)
21. ’08 Kobe Bryant (12–28) (5.1, 0.5, 5.6)
22. ’16 Kevin Durant (13–28) (5.0, 0.6, 5.6)
23. ’24 Joel Embiid (12–31) (3.8, 1.8, 5.6)
24. ’17 Kawhi Leonard (14–31) (4.2, 1.3, 5.5)
25. ’26 Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (14–31) (5.0, 0.5, 5.5)
26. ’16 Chris Paul (15–31) (4.5, 0.8, 5.3)
27. ’07 Steve Nash (18–33) (5.6, −0.3, 5.3)
28. ’09 Dirk Nowitzki (18–35) (4.9, 0.3, 5.2)
29. ’20 Anthony Davis (24–off list) (2.2, 2.8, 5.0)
30. ’76 Julius Erving (24–off list) (3.9, 1.0, 4.9)
31. ’00 Grant Hill (24–off list) (4.4, 0.5, 4.9)
32. ’24 Luka Dončić (26–off list) (5.1, −0.3, 4.8)
33. ’03 Tracy McGrady (26–off list) (4.6, 0.2, 4.8)
34. ’95 Karl Malone (29–off list) (3.8, 0.9, 4.7)
35. ’90 Charles Barkley (29–off list) (4.7, 0.0, 4.7)
36. ’83 Moses Malone (29–off list) (3.2, 1.4, 4.6)
37. ’19 James Harden (29–off list) (4.9, −0.3, 4.6)

Why I stop the exact ranking at 37

This is where my solid-MVP tier ends.

At this point the exercise reaches a level of compression where I no longer find an exact ordering meaningful. The next 16 players all grade as weak-MVP peaks. Their distributions overlap enough that I'm no longer comfortable pretending I know whether one should be 41st and another 47th. An evaluation that is just slightly different from mine could have many of these players 10 or more spots higher or lower, easily!

The same issue is already visible within the ranked portion. Karl Malone, Barkley, Moses and Harden are separated by only one tenth of a point per game in my central estimates. So I would not attach much significance to the difference between #34 and #37.

Once I cross below the solid-MVP threshold, I prefer to present tiers.

The historical distribution through #37 is:

• #1–2: GOAT-level
• #3–13: All-time level
• #14–25: Strong MVP
• #26–37: Solid MVP

That gives me 37 solid-MVP-or-better peaks in NBA history.

Honorable Mentions Pt. 1 — Weak MVP Peaks

The following 16 players make up the rest of my MVP-level historical peaks.

The ordering is approximate. The players nearer the top generally have stronger central estimates, but I would not treat their sequence with the same precision as the ranked 37.

• '96 Penny Hardaway (4.7, -0.2, 4.5)
• '75 Rick Barry (4.0, 0.5, 4.5)
• '71 Walt Frazier (2.7, 1.8, 4.5)
• '95 Scottie Pippen (2.5, 2.0, 4.5)
• '61 Elgin Baylor (4.1, 0.4, 4.5)
• '05 Manu Ginóbili (3.5, 0.9, 4.4)
• '70 Willis Reed (1.8, 2.5, 4.3)
• '16 Draymond Green (1.1, 3.2, 4.3)
• '74 Dave Cowens (2.1, 2.1, 4.2)
• '11 Dwight Howard (1.6, 2.6, 4.2)
• '99 Alonzo Mourning (1.4, 2.8, 4.2)
• '90 Patrick Ewing (1.8, 2.4, 4.2)
• '87 Kevin McHale (3.0, 1.1, 4.1)
• '88 Isiah Thomas (3.6, 0.4, 4.0)
• '74 Artis Gilmore (1.4, 2.6, 4.0)
• '67 Nate Thurmond (0.3, 3.7, 4.0)

This brings my historical total to 53 MVP-level peaks. The lower boundary is admittedly difficult. Gilmore and Thurmond are essentially sitting on it for me.

Thurmond is a particularly unusual evaluation because so much of his case comes from defense. His offense was limited enough that I am not comfortable moving him meaningfully higher, but I think the combination of enormous minutes, extreme pace and his elite interior defense creates just enough total game value to put him on the MVP side of the line.

That is roughly the level of player I mean when I use the term “weak MVP.” In a favorable season, I could plausibly see that player winning an MVP without concluding that the award itself reflected a fundamentally weaker standard of play.

Honorable Mentions Pt. 2 — Highest All-NBA Peaks

These are the next 13 peaks on my board:

• '81 Marques Johnson (3.4, 0.5, 3.9)
• '59 Bob Pettit (3.4, 0.5, 3.9)
• '25 Jayson Tatum (2.9, 1.0, 3.9)
• '03 Jason Kidd (2.1, 1.8, 3.9)
• '17 Russell Westbrook (3.8, 0.1, 3.9)
• '19 Paul George (2.6, 1.3, 3.9)
• '92 Clyde Drexler (3.4, 0.5, 3.9)
• '23 Jimmy Butler (2.6, 1.2, 3.8)
• '93 Mark Price (4.0, -0.2, 3.8)
• '87 James Worthy (3.4, 0.4, 3.8)
• '84 Bernard King (3.8, 0, 3.8)
• '90 John Stockton (2.9, 0.9, 3.8)
• '74 Bob Lanier (2.3, 1.5, 3.8)

These players sit immediately below my MVP threshold.

There are more strong All-NBA peaks in NBA history than the 13 listed here. I selected these because they are the highest remaining evaluations, form a reasonable cutoff, and stretch the post to the 66 best peaks on my current board.

Historical Distribution

Across the full list:

• 2 players reach GOAT-level
• 13 reach at least all-time level
• 25 reach at least strong-MVP level
• 37 reach at least solid-MVP level
• 53 reach at least weak-MVP level
• The final 13 are my highest-rated All-NBA peaks below the MVP threshold

In mutually exclusive groups:

• 2 GOAT
• 11 additional all-time
• 12 strong MVP
• 12 solid MVP
• 16 weak MVP
• 13 highest remaining All-NBA

That gives 66 total peaks in this post.

As always, I'm happy to discuss individual players, placements, comparisons, or anything else!

I went into this wanting to examine the effect of large veteran contracts on team building. As I got into it, I realized things were complicated. So I’m starting simple, trying to understand what is good value, where it comes from, and how it contributes to winning.

How Much a VORP Cost?

Here’s our recipe for calculating the cost of a point of VORP:

• Cost of VORP = League total salary / (League total regular season + playoff VORP)

Although it would have been easier to use the league salary cap as our numerator, a more honest accounting needs to include the extra 20% teams generally spend on average. Likewise, playoff production is real production, part of what teams pay for, so playoff VORP was included on par with regular season VORP. This adds roughly 12% to the VORP total.

For last year, the COST of VORP was $5.6b / (298.4 + 36.7) = $16.75m. To make this comparable across seasons, we can measure it as a percentage of the cap, rather than in dollars: $16.75m / $154.6m = 10.8%. Looking at the past 20 seasons, the cost fluctuates around 11% as the salary cap triples:

(* shortened seasons)

This gives us this rule of thumb:

1 point of VORP costs 11% of the salary cap

If we want to be lazy about it and exclude playoff VORP, it becomes 10%, an even rounder number. So:

In 2025-26 a fair value contract returned a point of VORP per $16.75m

Searching for Surplus Value

The problem with fair value contracts is that a team made up of them will be average. Here’s team VORP totals for the past season:

Spending your salary cap on fair value contracts gets you to 9 VORP. Spending another 20% on top might push that to 11 VORP, maybe enough to earn a play-in berth. To do better than that and make some noise in the playoffs, you need contracts that generate surplus. Eventual champion Knicks, runner up Spurs, conference finalist OKC, and the upstart Pistons all accumulated double that 11 VORP mark.

Value Over Salary Expectation (VOSE)

Generating surplus team VORP means having a team of players generating surplus value on their individual salaries. We can call this “Value Over Salary Expectation”, or VOSE:

• Total VORP = Regular Season VORP + Playoff VORP
• Expected VORP = Salary / Cost of VORP
• VOSE = Total VORP - Expected VORP

Let’s look at the player’s who generated the most production over expected for their salaries (cut-off 2.5 VOSE):

The massive generators of surplus are Wemby, a possible GOAT candidate on his rookie contract, and Shai and Jokic, two MVPs still in their primes. After a bit of a gap, prime Luka on a 30% contract is next on the list. These are arguably the best 4 players in the game, 2 of whom have won CHIPS ("Who Deserved the CHIP" parts 1, 2, 3, 4), and two who could.

The rest of the list is comprised of young stars on max contracts (Maxey, Cunningham, Barnes), high performers on rookie contracts (both Thompson twins, Duren, Chet, Knueppel), and young players outplaying cheap contracts (Champagnie, Avdija, Pritchard, Gillespie).

The flip side of this is players who produced the least compared to what would be expected for their contracts:

The worst 10 are players with salaries over 20% of the cap who missed games. Of these, we have players not playing much (LaVine and Poole), playing even less than that (AD, Trae, Morant, Sabonis), and not playing at all (Haliburton, Lillard, Kyrie). Only Middleton played a reasonable number of games, but as was the case with many of these players, it was within a ridiculous unserious tanking context.

Further down the list we see a combination of young players on tanking teams (Carrington, Cody Williams, Ace Bailey, Traoré, Dillingham), busts on medium money (DeAndre Hunter, Patrick Williams), good players missing games (Tatum, Garland), and Jalen Green, a young player who missed games and hasn’t yet lived up to his 20%+ contract.

The New York Knickerbockers

Absent from the above list of top VOSE players is any New York Knick. How did they do it?

The answer appears to be: 1) By overspending the cap by 34% ($207m payroll), 2) Peaking in the playoffs, and 3) By having 6 prime-age players with VOSE over 1. All of the Knicks in the playoff rotation returned some surplus, with even Shamet and McBride together contributed another point of VOSE. In a league of teams trying to hit grand slams, the Knicks won it all hitting singles and doubles.

1. Most players do not spend enough time in college to fully develop their game. They do not enter the league ready enough to challenge any of the established stars. That's not a knock on them or anything.

2. While most teams/coaches are willing to give players a chance to play based on potential, teams and coaches are also cautious about injuries/burn-out.

3. Rookies aren't expected to overhaul a team immediately. This is kinda similar to Point 2. After we have seen so many great talents fizzle out or end up having injuries that ruined their career due to trying to turn the fortunes of a team around immediately, I believe many teams are not expecting a one-man show/heroic act from their drafts anymore.

So what do you think? I think given the way the league is heading, I think there will never be a rookie MVP again.

It's maybe recency bias but in the 2024 off-season:

Nikola Topic tore his ACL

In 2025 off-season

Vanvleet tore his ACL

Thomas Sorber tore his ACL

Max Strus had a jones fracture

In 2026 so far

Henri Veesar tore his ACL

Shaedon Sharpe tore his meniscus

Mark Williams tore his labrum

Kon knueppel hamstring

Grant Williams hamstring

Were there always every off-season at least 2-5 players who would sustain a season ending or near season ending injury requiring major surgery?

All I remember was embiid missing his entire first year. Was that considered out of the ordinary?

Are more rookies who haven't played a minute of regular season basketball tearing their ACLs same summer they got drafted compared to the previous 2 decades?

Are preseason workouts and scrimmages becoming

more intense?

https://apnews.com/article/bob-pettit-dead-nba-hawks-92bb99e3a0bb11ed885e3c219cee77e8

"Bob Pettit, an imposing scorer and rebounder for the St. Louis Hawks and winner of the NBA’s first Most Valuable Player award in 1956, has died. He was 93."

RIP legend. First ever MVP in the league.

I’ve been looking back at Zach LaVine’s peak years in Chicago, and I’m curious how people view him in hindsight.
At his best, LaVine was roughly a 27 PPG, 5 RPG, 5 APG player while shooting around 50% from the field, 40% from three, and 85% from the line. Those are legitimately elite scoring numbers, especially considering the combination of volume and efficiency. This is also around the time where he got his max contract extension which didn’t seem like a bad deal at the time.

However even during those years, it never really felt like LaVine was viewed around the league as the type of superstar who could be the best player on a legitimate contender. There always seemed to be a distinction between “Zach LaVine is an elite scorer” and “Zach LaVine can lead your team somewhere.”
So what exactly was missing?
Was it mainly:
Defense? He seemed to make strides and be a better team defender
Playmaking and decision-making?
Not controlling games enough outside of scoring?
His team’s being bad and hurting his reputation? (Like Bradley Beal)
Lack of playoff opportunities during his prime?
Or was he simply better suited to being a #2 option next to a more complete superstar?
For comparison, there have been other guards putting up similar or even less impressive scoring numbers who were treated much more seriously as franchise players.
And when Chicago finally did put a better team around him with DeMar DeRozan, Lonzo Ball, Alex Caruso, and Nikola Vučević, the Bulls looked legitimately good for a stretch before injuries derailed things.

Was peak Zach LaVine underrated because of the situation he was in, or were there legitimate limitations in his game that prevented his production from translating into being a championship-level #1 option?
Interested in hearing from other Bulls fans especially, but also anyone who watched a lot of LaVine during his 2020–22 peak.

I think another question I have is what really separates a player from being a good player and someone who can lead you to a championship. Because if a guy who averaged 27 5 and 5 on nearly 50/40/90 splits isn’t viewed as that caliber of a player then what does?

I’m here to ask one rather simple question, will James harden reach 4,000 career 3PM? And if so how much longer do you think it’d take?

Considering over the past 3 seasons he’s played a genuinely impressive amount of time (that being 221 games or about 74 games played a season on about 35mpg and a decent amount of 3 point attempts AND makes (2.9 on 7.8 which is about 37% from behind the arc) considering we’re going into year 18 of his career this upcoming season (and age 37) along with him (potentially?) transitioning to he 3rd option scorer behind the likes of Mitchell and Mobley I’m going to assume his 3p volume will shrink, however let’s say it does not

James is 2nd all time in career 3’s with 3390 as of today, September 23 2026

Let say he somehow DOES keep his 3pm rate ~3 a game for ~74 games per szn

3 x 74 =222 3’s per season at this rate he’d have to play EXACTLY like he has the past few seasons until…
3390 + 222 =3,612 2026/27

3,612 + 222 =3,834 2027/28

3,834 + 222 =4,056. 2028/29

Harden would have to play until he’s about 40 years old and on top of that have played 1443 career games. For perspective that’s still about 200 career 3pm behind the all time leader Wardell Stephen Curry

This is under the assumption that he plays at this top 20ish player level he has in the last 3 years. If we are taking realistically; how close do YOU think he’ll get to 4k threes?

It is no secret that the free throw is the most valuable shot in basketball. Just looking at it from a mathematical stand point, the PPS for a free throw is the highest.

Taking this further,

I graphed a couple different things and tried to find the correlation.

Pretty much on the X axis there is either Share of PTS From FT, Share of PTS from 3P, Share of PTS from Midranges, Share of PTS from RIM and then on the Y its ORAPM (3 YEARS)

For all of them, min. 1750 Minutes in the 2025-26 season, I can't upload pictures so here is the correlations.

Free Throws had the highest correlation (r = .34) (the people with most points coming from ft were Deni, Banchero, Harden, Book, AR, Keyonte George, Demar, Zion)

Share of Points from 3 v oRAPM 3 years had a r = -.07 (being completely one dimensional isn't good on offense)

Share of Points from Midrange v oRAPM had r = .24 (This one made sense to me just because the players taking a lot of midranges are stars that are allowed by their coaching, like Shai, KD, Book, etc

Share of Points from Rim v oRAPM had r = -.12 (This one is pretty surprising; I guess if your value only comes from cutting/easy layups and stuff its harder to be productive. Obviously, there are outliers with high share on the rim and high value)

Overall, I guess free throws are a good way to predict offensive impact. Getting fouled is very good for team success. Let me know what you guys think

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

Laker fans already know this, and I suspect Dallas fans must know it as well. But saw someone claim today that having Luka means you'll have more assists, and I realized other fans might not realize how much he dominates and stops the ball from flowing.

So I went to Basketball Reference's On/Off numbers for a quick statistical proof. Here are the team's assist %'s with and without Luka on the court, for every season of his career:

2026:

59.1 with Luka, 65.1 without Luka

2025 (Dal/LAL):

60.0/61.7 with Luka, 60.1/64.1 without Luka

2024:

57.9 with Luka, 63.1 without Luka

2023:

54.3 with Luka, 61.9 without Luka

2022:

57.6 with Luka, 62.2 without Luka

2021:

55.1 with Luka, 56.9 without Luka

2020:

57.7 with Luka, 61.1 without Luka

2019:

58.2 with Luka, 62.3 without Luka

The consistency is incredible. Every team, every season, sees roughly 4-5% more of their shots get assisted when Luka is off the court than when he's one it.

This is not saying that he's a bad offensive player or that he makes the offense less efficient or anything....but there's clearly less passing when he's on the court.

Good Afternoon y'all! NBA Season one month away.

Wrote about creating xPTS-RAPM about two months ago and how it gave great insight into Kevin Durant and the value of tough shotmaking.

This post is another excerpt from the paper and will focus on case studies of other players, specifically how xPTS-RAPM can quantify the extent and value of a player's impact on shot diet.

xPTS-RAPM and its sister metric, Conversion RAPM (cRAPM), also provide a way to decompose RAPM away from an opaque number

What Is xPTS?

xPTS is the expected point valuation of each field goal and free throw attempt compared to league average.

It grades each shot attempt on a scale stripping out luck and individual conversion skill.

xPTS(shot) = league PPP of the shot's bin
             (zone × distance × shot family × possession context)

xPTS(free throw) = league avg FT% × 1

Total xPTS = Σ bin value of every field goal attempt
             + league FT% × free throw attempts

Each field goal attempt is placed into a bin based on four characteristics:

• Court zone: 14 zones
• Shot distance: two-foot increments
• Shot family: drive, cut, catch-and-shoot, self-created, alley-oop, or putback
• Possession context: halfcourt, transition, second-chance, or off-turnover
• Defender Distance: Sports VU leak, (not availible to use, so below is xPTS wihtout defender distance)

This codified approximately 707 bins per season across roughly 219,000 field goal attempts.

Here is a sampling of bins across the value spectrum.

2025-26 bin table, league-wide. Shots column is the bin sample size.

xPTS-RAPM

Instead of seeing how a player's on-court presence adds to or subtracts from a team's net rating over a huge sample of possessions, you see how a player's on-court presence influences a team's expected point value.

Are they creating numerically optimal shots? Are they suppressing numerically optimal shots? How are they warping the geometry of the court?

Like a normal RAPM, you can then decompose this further into offensive xPTS-RAPM (oxRAPM) and defensive xPTS-RAPM (dxRAPM): how a player changes the geometry of the court to bend his team toward more favorable shot conditions, and how his presence helps suppress favorable shot conditions on the other side.

Best offenders and defenders below.

Offensive xPTS-RAPM

2025-26 3-year Offensive xPTS-RAPM, top 10.

Minimum 2,000 weighted possessions.

Defensive xPTS-RAPM

2025-26 3-year Defensive xPTS-RAPM, top 10.

Minimum 2,000 weighted possessions.

As you may notice, Donovan Clingan and the Thompson twins are amongst the most surprising and notable leaders, especially since they are not good three-point shooters, nor are they playmakers.

These leaders are actually a great case study of what this RAPM measures.

Clingan is a chance-quality machine in three distinct ways.

His rebounding: 22.2 offensive rebounds per 100 shots is a good 30% more than league average. Many of those rebounds convert a dead possession into a putback or a kick-out, which sit amongst the most highly priced bins, around 1.3 to 1.5 expected points.

And his rebounding lets Portland manufacture its diet: with him on the court, Portland takes 49% of its shots from three and 32% at the rim, while opponents get only 26% of their shots at the rim.

Portland's offense with Clingan on is extremely Morey-pilled: rim attempt or three-point attempt.

For the Thompson twins, Amen is actually the best offensive geometry-bender in the league (bar Giannis).

He is the offensive xPTS engine: extreme rim pressure and second chances.

Remember, with expected points there is no tax, no punishment for neither his or his team's lack of conversion.

Houston Offense With Amen Thompson

Houston's offense with Amen Thompson on and off the floor, 2025-26 regular season. Expected and actual points are per 100 possessions.

Ausar, meanwhile , is great defensively.

His presence lets his own team take 35.8% of its shots at the rim while dropping opponents' rim share to about 24.3%, and he forces about 19 turnovers per 100, zeroing out those possessions entirely.

Opponent Offense With Ausar Thompson

What opposing offenses do against Detroit with Ausar Thompson on and off the floor, 2025-26 regular season. Expected and actual points are per 100 possessions allowed.

On the inverse, you have the players who perform extremely poorly in net xPTS-RAPM.

The worst being Bub Carrington, and the interesting point about him is that there is no single horrific channel.

He has, up to this point, been poor among so many.

Washington's offense becomes extremely midrange-heavy when he is on the court. His personal game is heavily pull-up-weighted with no rim pressure, which drags Washington into the cheapest quantified shot values.

He provides no transition boost, below-average offensive rebounding, and above-average turnovers, essentially never generating or forcing his team toward more optimal chances while leaking possessions along the way.

Washington Offense With Bub Carrington

Washington's offense with Bub Carrington on and off the floor, 2025-26 regular season. Expected and actual points are per 100 possessions.

33.9% of opponents' shots come at the rim with him on, against a league average of about 28.7%, while opponents take only 25.8% from midrange, the exact inverse of what a good defense produces.

He does not create turnovers. He gives up straight drives to the rim, and opponents' free-throw share runs above average.

Opponent Offense With Bub Carrington

Washington's defense with Bub Carrington on and off the floor, 2025-26 regular season. Expected and actual points are per 100 possessions.

Some honest context, which I will return to in the caveats: he plays for a 17-win team that has been bad as an entire unit, he is a young guard given developmental freedom and reps, and the collinearity weakness of any ridge regression does exist.

Bottom Net xPTS-RAPM

The bottom of the same board. Three-season window anchored on 2025-26. Minimum 2,000 weighted possessions.

xPTS is one of of the Shot Quality Decomp of RAPM

The beauty of xPTS-RAPM is that it is subtly a decomposition channel of RAPM itself: one half of a shot-quality decomposition.

xPTS-RAPM is the half that measures how many chances a player creates or suppresses through the geometry of the floor.

Its sister, Conversion RAPM, measures how much his presence helps convert, or deny, shots above expected.

The summation of the two gets you Net/Pure RAPM, the standard RAPM we all know and love, the one that measures how team net rating moves with a player on or off the court.

Conversion RAPM

xPTS-RAPM: a quantification of how a player influences his team's shot diet.

Conversion RAPM: a quantification of how a player's on-court influence alters the points created/suppressed above/below expected.

Conversion RAPM (cRAPM)

2025-26 3-year Conversion RAPM (cRAPM).

Points above expected per 100 possessions, on versus off.

Minimum 2,000 weighted possessions.

Net RAPM

Using independently derived expected-points measure for shot values, and the conversion above or below those shot values, adding the two regularized adjusted plus-minuses together gives you a number that is 99.99999% equivalent to a pure, no-prior RAPM. that has functional value.

This is the part I am extremely excited for.

Standard pure RAPM asks what happens to the score:

How does net rating change with this player on and off the court?

xPTS and Conversion take that question and rip it into two further questions.

How much does this player change his team's quantified shot diet?

And:

How much does his presence swing his team's conversion above or below that shot diet?

Essentially, separating regularized adjusted plus-minus into shot-quality impact and conversion impact.

Net RAPM

Pure RAPM is a separate ridge solve on actual points: same stint rows, lineup matrix, weights, centering, and α = 10,000; no priors.

(Yes, 10K, but remember any RAPM solve works as long as it's consistent for all the decomps.)

Minimum 2,000 weighted possessions.

The identity requires the same RAPM specification in all three solves: the same stint rows, lineup matrix, stint weights, centering, and ridge penalty.

others can reproduce this even while using different stints or a different xPTS model as long as conversion is defined as actual points minus expected points and all three solves use the same settings.

Appreciate y'all reading. It was very fun to dive into the numbers and have it kind of match my eye test a little bit. Open for any questions, concerns, or advice.

Blog Post wiht interactive tables: https://court-share.com/luma/blog/xpts-rapm
Past Post about Kevin Durant and the Value of Tough Shotmaking
Data will be opensourced on Github and linked here by next week (KEEP ME ACCOUNTABLE)

Leaderboard of xPTS v1 (this is v2)

Basically the title. If you kept the 26-27 Thunder roster the exact same but swapped SGA with prime Russ, are they as good, worse, or better than they are now? Are they still likely to win a chip in today's NBA?

First thing that comes to mind for me is that SGA's skillset and shooting may put him above Russ as an individual player, but Russ' playmaking could arguably better allow them to get the most of their roster to feed all their scorers. For example SGA is known for not being a good lob passer, whereas Russ could feed Chet lobs all day as he did with Steven Adams.

I'd put this Russ version of the 26-27 Thunder as still in the same tier as the Spurs, where it is them two in the top tier and everyone else is below them. But would probably say the Thunder do overall get slightly worse since SGA's scoring is so lethal, even though he has improvements he can make as a playmaker.

With actually bold I mean guys that are absolutely out of the radar and you think will become very good. Deeper pulls that you believe will finally shine.

The biggest example of a guy in that mold last year was Ryan Rollins, who definitely the average NBA fan (and even a few hardcore ones) didn’t know about, and now is a very respected starting-caliber guy.

I’ll start: Ryan Dunn (PHX), a guy whose defensive potential is IMO close to DPOY-level and offensive growths have been intriguing;

Day’Ron Sharpe (BKN), a center who has been very good off the bench and now I think will solidify as a quality starting big, maybe even better than Claxton.

Ron Holland (BKN), a former Top 5 pick whose offense still hasn’t come around, despite already being a great defender. Elite first step, solid scoring instincts and a good FT%, which often reflects a jumpshot increase, make me believe that his offensive jump could be coming.

The bucks are one of the few teams in the NBA with 2 legit starting level stretch 5s and that gives the Bucks pretty unique lineup options that can potentially synergize with the large amount of young but talented guards they have, kind of how Movley and Allen cover for Mitchell's, Garlands and Harden's defense issues.

Do you think Ware and Turner would play well together in a lineup? Which center would be better at the 4?

I feel like Ware would cover Turner's rebounding weaknesses at least, while Turner would operate on the perimeter better, and both would be able to protect the rim.

Ausar is undoubtedly one of the best defenders in the league, but despite what he brings defensively, I still have a hard time seeing him become a key piece of a contending team in the modern NBA.

Offence and defence are both important but the value of offence outweighs the value of defence, both on a team and individual level, which is why I struggle with envisioning Ausar becoming a core player. 

After 3 seasons in the league, Ausar still hasn’t shown enough offensive development for me to believe that he has much potential on that end of the ball. The most obvious issue with him is that he can’t shoot 3s. That could be overlooked if he was providing significant offensive value in most other areas, but he doesn’t. Not only can he not shoot 3s, but he’s also a poor midrange shooter (32%, 11th percentile). As a scorer, Ausar is virtually ineffective when operating outside of the paint. 

Ausar can get to the rim, but he isn’t an elite rim finisher and he doesn’t capitalize on his ability to get downhill because of his poor free throw shooting. This past season, Ausar shot 57% from the line, which places him 3rd percentile in ft%. His 2nd year was his best year ft% wise, but even that was only 64% (12th percentile). He’s still a good rim scorer (67%, 62nd percentile), but he isn’t good enough to the point where it negates his lack of scoring from everywhere else

Although Ausar is a good passer, his ball-handling is too poor for him to be a secondary ball handler, as he can’t dribble well and is very turnover prone when pressure is applied. 

I’m aware of the value he brings as an offensive rebounder, but even then the value of his offensive rebounding is hindered by his poor scoring ability. In transition, Ausar scores 1.04 PPP, which places him in the 27th percentile. As a finisher, Ausar has a 57.8 ts% with a -8.2 rTS%, which places him in the 36th and 18th percentile respectively.

One of the issues with Ausar’s scoring is his lack of confidence, as he tends to shy away from contact rather than finishing strong, and in general he lacks aggression. I don’t think it all just comes down to confidence, but it does contribute to his offensive limitations. 

With all that being said, I don’t think Ausar has what it takes to be more than just a role player coming off the bench, and not as a 6th man either. He can’t play significant minutes in the playoffs for a contender unless his offence seriously improves because he’s too easy to neutralize, and the team can be forced to play 4 v. 5 offensively due to his lack of being a scoring threat.

This was evident in the playoffs while watching Suggs sag off Ausar, but it’s also in the numbers. In the regular season, Ausar had a +7.2 net rating, with most of that coming from his offensive rating (+6.5). In the playoffs, however, Ausar’s net rating went from +7.2 to +6.3, with most of that value coming from his defence, as his offensive rating went from being a +6.5 in the regular season to just a +0.2 in the playoffs. When the game slows down, it doesn’t take much scheming for the limitations of players like Ausar to be exploited.

In today’s game, top tier defence alone is just not enough from a starting level player unless they’re a center, and even then it still isn’t enough sometimes (looking at you Gobert). Ausar is due for an extension soon, it’ll be interesting to see what number Detroit lands at. I don’t think you can pay a player like him more than ~20 mil AAV, however I’d lean closer to the full MLE. For as good as he is defensively, I just don’t think it’s enough to offset how limited he is offensively.

TL;DR: LeBron James has played 1,622 regular-season games without ever recording exactly 27 points, 7 rebounds, and 7 assists. Running the probability analysis gives an estimated 20% chance of making it this far without one.

LeBron has now played 23 NBA seasons.

His career averages are:

26.8 points, 7.5 rebounds, 7.4 assists

Yet in 1,622 regular-season games, he has never finished with exactly:

27 points, 7 rebounds and 7 assists.

The original version of this analysis, after the 2017-18 season, estimated a 31.87% chance that LeBron would make it that far without one.

Source: https://np.reddit.com/r/nba/comments/96hp4p/oc_lebron_has_averaged_2777_for_15_years_why/

Eight seasons later, he still has zero.

So I decided to do an update

The model

Points, rebounds, and assists are correlated, so you can't just calculate:

P(27 points) × P(7 rebounds) × P(7 assists)

Instead, like the original analysis, I fit a separate multivariate normal distribution for each season using LeBron's points, rebounds, and assists.

An exact 27-7-7 is treated as the range of:

• 26.5 to 27.5 points
• 6.5 to 7.5 rebounds
• 6.5 to 7.5 assists

For each season, the model estimates the probability p of one game landing in that box.

If LeBron plays G games, then:

Chance of no 27-7-7 that season = (1 - p)^G

Then you multiply those season probabilities across his career.

Here are the result:

So after 23 seasons:

Chance LeBron would still have zero 27-7-7 games: 20.3%

Or roughly:

1 in 5.

Is this actually a statistical anomaly?

Not really, 20% isn't really that low, it's still surprising though. And now that he's on the 6ers, it's unlikely he'll be able to/need to consistently score enough to be able to get a 27/7/7 game.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

My brother and I are having a debate and I want other people's opinions. The question: generally speaking does playing NFL football or NBA basketball require more skill and/or athleticism? This question can be interpreted in many different ways and pretty much all of them are valid.

I'm not nearly as knowledgeable about the NFL as I am the NBA, and I'm trying to answer the question as objectively as possible. In my opinion, the NBA requires more of their players than the NFL generally speaking. I'm aware the NFL has a myriad of different positions that all require vastly different skills and types of athleticism from their players, but I think the fact that the NFL has so many built in stoppages and players only play one side of the ball means the NBA is much more demanding in terms of skills and athleticism.

Now obviously NBA players are not doing anything as intense as some plays in the NFL. Nobody in the NBA is getting tackled and whatnot. That said, there are a lot of plays in a football game where a lot of players aren't involved in anything. And when the play is over they get to take 30 seconds to walk down field and get ready for the next play. Then on a change of possession they get to go sit while their teammates play the other side of the ball. Am I wrong?

And the positions are so specific that the players need such a smaller set of skills to be successful. Nobody needs to be good at throwing besides the quarterbacks. Wide receivers never need to learn how to tackle and counter an offense like linebackers, right?. Only one or two guys needs to know how to kick. Compared to NBA players who are all expected to know how to shoot, pass, dribble, finish and run offensive and defensive schemes to some degree. Obviously NBA players fit into different roles and have different expectations based on their skill level, but their inadequacies are held against them. If you can't dribble you're considered a worse player, and coaches aren't going to have you run pick n rolls. If you can't defend you better be an amazing offensive player or else you might not get minutes. Meanwhile nobody cares if a tight end can't play safety.

I know I'm really one sided on this, but I'm willing to have my mind changed. I obviously don't know much about football so I'm trying to get more perspectives on this. What do you think? What am I missing? Also, if you know an NFL analysis subreddit I should post this too let me know.

It was made in 2004 and it’s currently eFG%, TOV%, ORB%, and FTr

The NBA has changed a lot since then and I think it’s good, but I think it could be improved upon. I think it should be an odd number of factors to avoid ties (I’m thinking 5)

My idea so far is combining eFG% and FTr to just TS% and keeping TOV% and ORB%. Or maybe keeping it at those 3. What do you guys think and what should be added?

Every year we see at least a few role players take videos of themselves practicing off dribble midrange pullups or drive layups, or any other shot that they would never be let to take because they simply lack the talent or because there's star players on their team who will be demand to be fed the ball.

For example, this year Moussa Diabate of all players, a hustle non shooting big with a broken jump shot, took videos of himself doing off dribble pullups.

Do players who will only be on the floor to stay to catch and shoot, cut and/or rim run actually practice off dribble shots or is it simply one practice session out of hundreds that they choose to upload on socialedia because it makes them look cool?

Have there been any cases of coaches during the off-season threatening o DNP players when the season starts because they were spending too much time practicing moves that wasn't in their range of responsibilities(like middy pullups instead of say, learning to cut better or defensive footwork)?

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

I’m very optimistic about the Wizards due to the talent on the roster but I have some skepticism about how far this team can win due to the lack of 3 point shooting on the starting lineup.

I know the bench has some great 3 point shooters with Bub Carrington, Tre Johnson and Kris Middleton. But the bench is not going to be out there all the time with the exception of maybe Tre Johnson and Middleton at times but most of the time the starters are gonna be out there on the floor.

But most of the starting lineup aren’t good 3 point shooters and that’s a major concern when it comes to the team reaching its highest potential.

AD can’t shoot the 3 and always been a bad 3 point shooter & shoots the 3 at low volume for his career, Alex Sarr isnt a proven shooter and has only shot 33% from 3 last season, AJ Dybantsa hasn’t proven he can shoot the 3 and shot only 33% from 3 in his 1st year at BYU and Trae Young shoots 35% from 3 for his career but has shot below 35% from 3 in 5 out of his 8 seasons in the NBA.

The only player that can shoot the 3 in the starting lineup is Kyshawn George who shot 38% from 3 last season.

Can the Wizards win a lot of games despite the lack of 3 point shooters in the starting lineup due to their size, athleticism and rim pressure with players like Trae Young, AJ, AD and Alex bring or will the paint be too clogged for this to work?

Also, guys like AJ and AD are great midrange shooters and I’m curious if players like AJ and AD can counter bad spacing with no 3 point shooting with midrange shooting to open up more space?

1. AJ Dybantsa creates gravity with the midrange whether it’s off the dribble with his pullup middy, post fadeaway where he’s catching it from the post off the ball or dribbling towards a post fadeaway or facing up in the midrange using the triple threat. Also, AJ can use the post fadeaway on both shoulders. And AJ counters with the midrange with the up and unders and step throughs with his footwork. AJ can blow past guys with his 1st step in the triple threat with the threat of his midrange and athleticism. AJ can be dynamic with his off the dribble moves with the hesi’s, crossovers, in & outs, stepbacks, Euro steps and spin moves which creates so much gravity. Also, AJ’s athleticism allows him to finish and blow past guys off the dribble. AJ has a loose handle and it’s not tight really where he dribbles way across his body but he can get away with it & not have the flawed handle be a detriment for him due to his athleticism & creativity off the dribble. AJ has more of an And1 mixtape streetball handle and that works in the NBA and you don’t need a traditional handle to be productive in this league. AJ opens up so much space with his midrange and athleticism getting downhill which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity AJ brings.

2. Darryn Peterson creates gravity as a C&S 3 point shooter as a spot up player or movement shooter coming off screens and can score from off the dribble pull up 3s. The lethal 3 ball Darryn has creates gravity for him to get to the rim or get to his pull up middy. Darryn keeps it simple with his dribbles as a perimeter player but he still creates so much gravity due to how lethal his shooting ability is especially from 3 which opens up so many opportunities for him to score. Darryn opens up so much space with his 3 ball which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity Darryn brings.

3. Cam Boozer creates gravity as a C&S spot up 3 point shooter and pick & pop 3 point shooter, roller to the rim as a screener, offensive rebounder, post ups, cutter and creates mismatches with playing bully ball against smaller guys guarding him and using his perimeter skills as a ball handler against bigger guys guarding him who have slower feet & not as quick as him. Cam keeps it simple with his dribbles as a perimeter style big but he still creates so much gravity due to his big size at 6’9 250 which gives him an advantage of just using his size to leverage him getting to the rim without needing a lot of counter moves to blow past guys and he has a tight handle and doesn’t have a loose handle like a lot of bigs have. Cam opens up so much space with his below the rim finishing and 3 ball which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity Cam brings.

4. Caleb Wilson creates gravity with his vertical spacing. Caleb creates gravity the same way as many athletic bigs do like a Deandre Jordan, Blake Griffin, Amare Stoudemire, Shawn Kemp, Orlando Shaq, Giannis, Anthony Davis, Clint Capela or Wemby where their dynamic getting downhill by dunking the ball as a roller to the rim, catching lobs or dunking the ball in transition. Caleb creates gravity by being a great finisher around the rim in that restricted area and dunker spot area. Caleb has some gravity with him catching the ball in the post and using his post fadeaway that is useful at times. Very raw with his perimeter skills but is yet TBD with how good the perimeter skills are with Caleb not showcasing a lot of his perimeter skills at UNC and his perimeter skills being a short sample size in Summer League. The flaw in Caleb’s perimeter skills in the SL was that defenders kept stripping the ball away from him and stealing it as he was dribbling and that’s something he can work on getting to the league and a lot of this is due to Caleb’s loose handle which needs to be tighter. Caleb opens up so much space with his vertical spacing being a dynamic dunker around the restricted area and dunker spot area which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity Caleb brings.

Question: Based on the scoring gravity each prospect presents, which prospect can utilize their scoring gravity the best way for themselves & their teammates and help their team win with their scoring gravity the most? Which prospect has the most defensive attention drawn from opposing teams and can pull the most defenders towards them and give open space for their teammates the most with how they score?